POWER OF LEGISLATIVE BODIES TO PUNISH FOR
CONTEMPT
In 1924, the proceedings of the committee of the Senate of
the United States appointed for the purpose of investigating the
management of the Department of Justice by Attorney General
Harry M. Daugherty were brought to a standstill by the refusal
of his brother, Mally S. Daugherty, to appear before the committee and produce the books of a certain bank in Ohio of which
he was president, which were believed to contain certain important
information on the subject under investigation. When he was
arrested by the sergeant-at-arms of the Senate for the purpose of
compelling his attendance before the committee, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio discharged him
on habeas corpus,' and the desired information was never obtained. The case was appealed and is still pending before the
Supreme Court of the United States. This incident raised a
question of great interest and importance to the country as to how
far legislative bodies can go in compelling the giving of testimony
and the production of books and papers by unwilling witnesses.
The question is not new. It has been before the Supreme Court
in four outstanding cases 2 and has been passed on many times
by state courts. But while the courts are in agreement on many
phases of the subject, other very important phases of it remain
to be determined. Upon the proper determination of these matters will to an extent depend the future effectiveness of our legislatures as law-making bodies and as agencies for keeping the
public informed of the operations of their governments,, state and
national. It seems appropriate, therefore, that the whole subject
1
Ex parte Daugherty, 299 Fed. 620 (D.C. 1924). When, in January, x926,
relator in this case was called before a federal grand jury in New York investigating alleged misconduct of the alien property custodian, he stated that he had
given the same records involved in the Senate's inquiry to his brother, former
Attorney-General Harry M. Daugherty, who "wanted to look over certain matters-mostly politics-and see where he stood," and that they had been burned.Boston Herald, Jan. 23, x926, p. 14, c. 2. See also editorial in the same paper,
Jan. 29, 1926, P. 14, c. 3. See also The New Republic, March 31, 1926, pp. 164-

167.
1o3

, Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat 204 (U. S. 1827); Kilbourn v. Thompson,
U. S. i68 (i88o) ; In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 (1897); Marshall v. Gor-

don, 243 U. S. 52r (1917).

(6g1)
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should be examined with some degree of care in an effort to*
discover if possible the principles upon which legislatures and
courts may safely proceed in such cases.
It will be found as the discussion proceeds that the power of
legislatures to punish for contempt is closely boind up with the
ancient privileges of such bodies and of their members, as it
furnishes the means by which they are able to give effect to the
privileges claimed. It will also be seen that the privileges of
legislative bodies in this country and the means of making them
effective are derived, not so much from any express delegation in
our constitutions, state and national, as from the laws and customs
of the English House of Commons transmitted through the colonial assemblies as a well-established legal tradition and adopted
into our constitutions, mainly by implication, as an integral and
inherent part of the "legislative power" which the fathers conferred upon our representative assemblies. Only by arriving at
a clear understanding of what those words meant to them can we
determine the extent of the powers conferred.

I. ARE ENGLISH PRECEDENTS OF VALUE IN THis COUNTRY?
At the very outset it seems necessary to answer a question
that at first blush seems too obvious to call for consideration, that
is, whether the precedents of the House of Commons have any
persuasive value for us in this country. As our common law was
inherited from England and our legislative machinery and procedure were largely modeled on the British pattern, an affirmative
answer would seem to follow as a matter of course. But serious
doubt was raised as to the value of such precedents by the opinion
of the United States Supreme Court in the celebrated case of
Kilbournv. Thompson.3 In that case, the court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Miller, admitted that the power of the House of Commons to imprison for contempt of its authority had been fully
sustained by the courts of Westminster Hall, but contended that
such precedents were of no value to us for the reason that the
House of Commons was a court as well as a legislative body, and
' See note 2, supra.
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that in punishing for contempt, it was exercising a judicial power
that had come down from the days when the two houses sat as
4
one body, the High Court of Parliament. In support of his
thesis, Justice Miller gives extracts from the opinions in several
English cases, stating that the House of Commons is a court,
most of which seem to be based on a statement to that effect in
Coke's Institutes, 5 and then he draws the following conclusion:
"We are of the opinion that the right of the House of
Representatives to punish the citizen for a contempt of its
authority or a breach of its privileges can derive no support
from the precedents and practices of the two Houses of the
English Parliament, nor from the adjudged cases in which
the English courts have upheld these practices." 6
Thus, by taking the affirmative side of the much-controverted
question as to whether or not the House of Commons is a court,
Mr. Justice Miller disposed in summary fashion of the great mass
'Justice Miller states his position as follows:
"While there is, in the adjudged cases in the English courts, little agreeinent of opinion as to the extent of this power, and the liability of its exercise to be inquired into by the courts, there is no difference of opinion as to
its origin. This goes back to the period when the bishops, the lords, and
the knights and burgesses met in one body, and were, when so assembled,
called the High Court of Parliament. . . . Upon the separation of the
Lords and Commons into two separate bodies, holding their sessions in different chambers, and hence called the House of Lords and the House of
Commons, the judicial function of reviewing by appeal the decisions of the
courts of Westminster Hall passed to the House of Lords, where it has
been exercised without dispute ever since. To the Commons was left the
power of impeachment, and, perhaps, others of a judicial character, and.
jointly they exercised, until a very recent period, the power of passing bills
of attainder for treason and other high crimes which are in their nature
punishment for crime declared judicially by the High Court of Parliament
of the Kingdom of England. It is upon this idea that the Houses of Parliament were each courts of judicature originally, which, though divested
by usage, and by statute, probably, of many of their judicial functions, have
yet retained so much of that power as enables them, like any other court, to
punish for contempt of these privileges and authority that the power rests."
-io3 U. S. 184.
'Thus from the case of Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East x (18I), is taken the
following quotation from the opinion by Mr. Justice Bailey:
"In an early authority upon the subject, in Lord Coke, 4 Inst. 23, it is
expressly laid down that the House of Commons has not only a legislative
character and authority, but it is also a court of judicature; and there are
instances put there in which the power of committing to prison for contempts
has been exercised by the House of Commons, and this, too, in cases of
libel."-o3 U. S. 184.
4 iO3 U. S. 189.
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of English parliamentary precedents and court decisions, which
for the most part were unfavorable to the views expressed by
him. But he is not consistent in this particular, for a little further
on in his opinion he makes liberal use of English court decisions
when they suit his purpose,. and, in the following quotation which
he reproduces from the opinion of Mr. Justice Coleridge in Stockdale v. Hansard,7 he completely answers his own dictum that theHouse of Commons is a court:
"The House is not a court of law at all in the sense in
which that term can alone be properly applied here. Neither
originally nor by appeal can it decide a matter in litigation
between two parties; it has no means of doing so; it claims
no such power; powers of inquiry and accusation it has, but
it decides nothing judicially, except where it itself is a party
in the case of contempts." 8
As to whether the House of Commons is in law a court, is
perhaps very difficult to say. The House itself has taken both
sides of the proposition. Thus the English constitutional historian, Henry Hallam, calls attention to an entry on the rolls of
Parliament in the time of Henry IV to the effect that the judicial
9
powers of Parliament did not belong to the House of Commons,
and Sir Thomas Erskine May, the great authority on parliamentary procedure, quotes a resolution of the Commons of 1592,
° It seems
to the effect that that body was a court of record.'
probable that in earlier times the House of Commons did not
seriously claim to be a court, but as the Commons grew stronger
and especially as the conflict with the Crown came on, the House
and its partisans, such as Lord Coke, put forward every claim
calculated to enhance the power and prestige of that body." This
9 Ad. & E. 1 (1838).
io3 U. S. i98.
'HALLAM, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 5th ed. 2o7.
MAY, LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND USAGE OF PARLIAMENT,

13th

ed. (1924), ioi.

' It must 6e remembered that Coke's Institutes were written in the midst of
the fiercest internal struggle that England ever experienced. Soon after the
work came from the hands of the printer, the remnant of the revolutionary
House of Commons resolved itself into a high court of justice and sent Charles

I to the block. Statements made by Coke pertaining to matters involved in the
struggle must be accepted with great caution.

Thus Prof. E. C. Corwin, in
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mental attitude continued for some time after the final triumph
of Parliament in 1688, but, after the occasion for asserting the
claims had passed, we find Lord Mansfield saying that the House
12
of Commons was not a court, and May says that "this claim,
once firmly maintained, has latterly been virtually abandoned,
although never distinctly renounced." 18
commenting on Coke's attempt to find warrant in Magna Carta for the right
which he was seeking to establish that the subject could only be proceeded
against by the king upon presentment by a grand jury, has this to say:
"It must not be thought that in writing thus Coke is recording the
facts of history. Rather, to quote a recent authority on Magna Carta, he
was but 'following his vicious method of assuming the existence inMagna
Carta of a warrant for every legal principle established in his own day,' a
method which has enabled him to mislead utterly 'several generations of commentators.' Among those thus misled are the three great commentators on
American constitutional law, Kent, Story, and Cooley-willing dupes no
doubt, yet dupes none the less."--"The Doctrine of Due Process Before the
Civil War," 24 HAav. L. REy. 366, 368 (igio), citing, for the sub-quotations, McKechnie, MAGNA CARTA, 447.
Dean Roscoe Pound, in commenting on this phase of Coke's work, says:
"Coke's purpose was to prove his case in the contests between courts
and crown in which he was a chief actor. Recent historians who have reexamined the material in writing histories of the King's Council, the Star
Chamber and the High Commission, assert that he grossly perverted the
texts. Very likely he did for he was a partisan and an advocate. . . .
Coke's problem was what they [the provisions of Magna Carta] must be
made to mean if justice was to be done in accordance with them and by
means of them in seventeenth-century England. The fiction of interpretation enabled him and his contemporaries to believe that the two things were
the same."-INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HisToRY, z32.
To the same effect is the following from Prof. Redlich:
"Anyone who closely follows the party strife of the sixteenth and seventeenth Centuries under the leadership of the learned jurists of those times
will have little difficulty in seeing that their constitutional arguments, at
times bordering on the fantastic, were mere cloaks for the political claims to
power made by the majority of the House of Commons, and by sections of
the nation which it represented."--JosEPH REDLICH, PROCEDURE OF THE
HousEFOr Co moNs (Transl. by A. Ernest Steinhal), Vol. I, p. 25, note,
quoted and commented on by Prof. McIlwain in his HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT, pp. 230-I, note.
Jones v. Randall, I Cowp. 17 (774); MAY, oP. cit. 101.
"MAY, op. cit. XOI. For an elaborate discussion of the question as to
whether the House of Commons is a court, see McILWAIN, HIGH COURT OF
PARLIAMENT, c. III, pp. i09-246.
It is of interest to note that our legislative bodies in this country have
sometimes been referred to as courts. Thus in Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. I, 34
(i8o8) we find this language: "I consider the House of Representatives not
only as an integral branch of the legislature, and as an essential part of the
two houses in convention, but also as a court having final and exclusive cognizance of all matters within its jurisdiction, for the purposes for which it was
vested with jurisdiction." The contempt power is also fully recognized in this
case. The legislature of Massachusetts is still officially known as the "General Court."
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Whether the House of Commons be called a court or not, is
for purposes of this discussion, a matter of small moment. It is
fundamentally and essentially a legislative, and not a judicial,
body. The few remnants of judicial or quasi-judicial power that
it may still exercise are not materially different from the judicial
powers exercised formerly and to a lesser degree at the present
time by American legislative bodies. Coke, in the passage referred to in the decisions quoted by Justice Miller, enumerates
three such powers-( i) the power of impeachment, (2) the power
to punish for contempt, and (3) the power to bring to the attention of the House of Lords delinquencies committed by members
of that body.14 To this list Justice Miller, in the passages quoted
above, adds a fourth, the power, jointly with the House of Lords,
to pass bills of attainder. Now, it will be seen that the first and
third of these powers, that is the power, as the "generall inquisitors of the realm," to prefer impeachment charges to be tried by
the House of Lords, and the power ta direct the attention of that
body to cases of "oppression, bribery, extortion, or the like" on
the part of members of the upper house, are not strictly speaking
judicial in their nature, and the first is possessed and exercised by
the lower house of all our legislatures, state and national. If
possession of this power by the House of Commons makes it a
court, then our lower chambers are also courts, and the precedents
of the House of Commons would be very persuasive. If the
possession of the second power enumerated by Coke, that of punishing for contempt-the very power whose exercise we are now
considering--be held to make the House of Commons a court,
then Mr. Justice Miller's argument comes to this: "The possession
of the power to punish for contempt makes the House of Commons a court, and the House of Commons can punish for contempt because it is a court." It hardly need be said that such an
argument carries little weight. But Justice Miller's contention
goes a step further. He says that this power "goes back to the
period when the bishops, lords, knights and burgesses met in one
body." Historically this claim cannot be maintained. It now

344 COKE,

INST., 23-24.
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seems definitely established that the first instance in which the
House of Commons vindicated any power or privilege by imprisoning for contempt occurred in 1543, nearly three hundred years
after the Commons had become a separate body. 5 We will see
that our colonial assemblies to whose powers in this respect our
state legislatures succeeded, exercised the power to punish for
contempt practically from the time they came into existence, and
the houses of Congress had several times exercised the power
within the first decade of their existence. From these facts it
would seem that we can make out about as good a claim to a
prescriptive right to the exercise of contempt powers as can be
made out for the House of Commons.
The fourth judicial function, that added to Coke's list by
Justice Miller, is the right formerly exercised by the Commons,
conjointly with the Lords, of enacting bills of attainder. Lord
Coke did not mention this, presumably because he did not regard
it as a judicial power. It is rather the exercise of the legislative
power to pass special acts, a perverted form of legislation probably almost as common in this country in colonial and early postRevolutionary days as it ever was in England. Our state legislatures did not hesitate to pass bills of attainder 16 directed at those
"A
In discussing this first use of the contempt power, Hallam says:

"The Commons sent their sergeant with his mace to demand the release of Ferrers, a burgess, who had been arrested on his way to the House;

the jailers and sheriffs of London having not only refused compliance,
but ill treated the sergeant, they compelled them

. .

.

and even the

plaintiff who had sued the writ against Ferrers, to appear at the bar of the
House, and committed them to prison. The king in the presence of the
judges confirmed in the strongest manner this assertion of privilege by
the Commons. It was, however, so far, at least, as our knowledge extends,
a very important novelty in constitutional practice; not a trace occurring
in any former instance on record, either of a party being delivered from
arrest at the demand of the sergeant, or of anyone being committed to
prison by the sole authority of the House of Commons."-HALLAM, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HisTORY OF ENGLAND, pp. 157-8.

See also MAY, TuE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND USAGE OF PARLIAMENT, 13th ed., pp. 112-113. May adds the interesting detail that before ordering the arrest of the sheriffs, the House of Commons laid the case before
the House of Lords, "who, judging the contempt to be very great, referred the
punishment thereof to the order of the Commons' house."
"Thompson, "Anti-Loyalist Legislation During the American Revolution;"

3 ILL L. Rxv. 8r, I47; Pound, "Justice According to Law," L4 COL. L. Rnv. r,

2, 8 (I914).

In this article Dean Pound calls attention to numerous instances

of the exercise of judicial power by American legislatures, such as granting

divorces, or creating special rules for particular cases or for particular indi-
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who sided with England in the Revolution, and at least one of
these measures was sustained by the United States Supreme Court
as a valid exercise of the legislative power. In the case of Cooper
v. Telfair,17 involving such a statute passed by the state of
Georgia, in 1782, before the United States Constitution forbade
the enactment of such laws, Mr. Justice Paterson used this significant language:
"The power of confiscation and banishment does not
belong to the judicial authority; and yet, it is a power that
grows out of the very nature of the social compact, which
must reside somewhere, and which is so inherent in the legislature, that it cannot be divested, or transferred, without an
express provision of the constitution." Is
From this it will be seen that the fathers were not legislating
against an imaginary danger when they provided in the Constitution that no bill of attainder could ever be passed either by the
national Congress or by any state legislature.19
If this opinion is correct and the power to pass bills of attainder is essentially legislative in character, then Mr. Justice
Miller's argument thiat the possession of this power makes the
House of Commons a court whose precedents are valueless to us
completely fails. Besides, the power to pass bills of attainder and
bills of pains and penalties has been obsolete in England for a
hundred years. 19a The truth is that a careful study of the legisla-

tive history of England and America will show that the privileges
of representative bodies and the power to punish directly the invasion of those privileges are a part of the common inheritance of
viduals, or affording special relief in individual cases, or granting new trials
after final judgment, or exercising jurisdiction in insolvency. The legislature
of Rhode Island exercised appellate jurisdiction until 1857, and the New York

Senate continued to act as a court of appeals until the adoption of the constitution of 1846.
"4 Dall. 14 (U. S. 1800).

184 Dall. ig. Almost identical language was used by Mr. Justice Cushing
in his brief concurring opinion.
"Constitution, Article I, Secs. 9 and io.
"'Dean Pound says that "the abortive bill of pains and penalties brought
against Queen Caroline is probably the last of its kind." 14 CAl. L. REv. 3
(1914). That was in the year i82o. rX DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY,
152.
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the Anglo-American peoples. At first the House of Commons was
a weak and timid body, asserting few privileges for itself and its
members and depending on the king and the lord chancellor to
protect them in the enjoyment of them. With the break-down of
the nobility at the end of the War of the Roses, and with the
growth of *thecities and the commercial classes during the Tudor
period, the Commons grew stronger and bolder and began to claim
more privileges and to assert the right to protect them by their
own direct means. Every privilege they succeeded, as the people's
representatives, in wresting from the king and nobility became a
part of the cherished rights of Englishmen, and were as highly
prized in the colonies as in the mother country. So we find the
colonial assemblies setting up precisely the same privileges and
vindicating them in precisely the same way, as was being done
contemporaneously by the House of Commons. Just as there
were excesses and brutal punishments there, so there were excesses
and brutal punishments here. And so, too, with the coming of
a more enlightened and humane spirit, excesses and barbarities
progressively disappear on both sides of the Atlantic, until today
the privileges asserted by the House of Commons and the means
by which they are vindicated are not appreciably different from
those asserted and vindicated by our state and national legislative
bodies. The contempt power is everywhere, in the Englishspeaking world, regarded as an inherent power, an essential auxiliary of "legislative power," and, as we will see, the nature and
extent of the power was scarcely affected at all by the advent of
written constitutions and the doctrine of the separation of the
powers of government. It follows that no one who would understand the subject can shut his eyes to the experience and practice
of the great assembly after which all our legislative bodies have
20
been modeled.
= The extent to which the-colonial assemblies modeled themselves on the
pattern of the House of Commons is strikingly illustrated in the faithfulness
with which they copied the ancient ceremony observed at the opening of a
session of Parliament. From a very early day, it is believed, and certainly
from the time of Henry VIII, when regular journals began to be kept, it has
been customary, upon the assembling of Parliament, for the House in a body
to wait upon the King sitting in the House of Lords, and present their newlyelected speaker for the King's approval. The choice having been approved, the
speaker,
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II. ENGLISH AND AmERICAN COLONIAL PRECEDENTS
A. Freedom from Arrest
While the privilege of freedom from arrest only included
freedom from arrest on civil process, and not for criminal offenses,2 2 it was extended to the servants and estates, as well as
to the person, of the member, as will be seen by reference to the
speaker's petition quoted above. This led to grave abuses during
the century following the Restoration and hundreds of persons
were haled before one house or the other and imprisoned for such
crimes as arresting the servants of members, or trespassing upon
their property, or bringing actions of ejectment against members
or their servants or even against their tenants-that is, for any
act that would necessitate the presence of the member in court
"In the name, and on behalf of the Commons, lays claim by humble
petition to their ancient and undoubted rights and privileges; particularly
that their persons, their estates, and their servants may be free from arrest and all molestation; that they may enjoy liberty of speech in all their
debates; may have access to his Majesty's royal person whenever occasion
shall require; and that all their proceedings may receive from his Majesty
the most favorable construction."
To this address the Lord Chancellor as the presiding officer replies that
"His Majesty most readily confirms all the rights and privileges which
have ever been granted to or conferred upon the Commons, by his Majesty
or any of his royal predecessors."--MAY, 7o.
In the same way the colonial assemblies demanded a renewal of their ancient privileges. For example, in 1734, the Assembly of Pennsylvania in a
body waited on the Governor, sitting with his council, and after he had approved the speaker chosen, that official "in the name and behalf of the House"
petitioned
"That the members of this House, during the Time of their Sitting
in Assembly, may enjoy Freedom of Speech in all their Propositions and
Debates; and that their Persons and Estates may be free from Arrest
and Molestation: That himself (as Speaker), as often as the.Business of
the House shall require, may have free Access to the Governor: That if in
reporting any Thing to the Governor as the Sense of the House, he happen to be mistaken, such Mistake may not be imputed to the House, but
that he have free Liberty to resort to them for their true Meaning, and
the Mistake be pardoned: That it would please the Governor to give
Credit to no Information he may receive without Doors, of Matters moved
and debated in the House, until the same shall have passed in Resolves."
To this petition, it is stated, the Governor was "pleased to assure the
House, that he would always protect them in the full Enjoyment and Exercise
of the same."-Votes of Assembly, Vol. III, 219. For repetitions of this
ceremony in the same words in other years, see Votes of Assembly, Vol. III,
444, 497, 536; Vol. IV, 757; Vol. VI, 2, 113, 193, 262, 284, 546.
' American colonial precedents have not heretofore been collected and
made available.
'MAY, 120.
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as either plaintiff or defendant.2 3 Finally Parliament itself saw
that it had grossly perverted a very useful and valuable privilege,
and, partly by statute and partly by custom, the excesses have been
eliminated until now the protection is confined, as in this country,
to freedom from arrest of the member only, on civil process, during the sessions of Parliament and for a reasonable period before
24
and after the session.
In America the colonial assemblies, following the example of
the mother country, claimed the same freedom for themselves,
their servants, and their estates. 25 This claim they made good by
imprisoning those who disregarded it Thus in 1691, the New
York Assembly incarcerated a sheriff who arrested and detained
a member-elect on his way to attend the session, 26 and in 1740 it
imprisoned one C. Den for nearly a month for seizing a boat used
by a member for attending its sessions.27 In the same year, the
Housd'of Burgesses of Virginia punished as for contempt a person
who assaulted a member's servant and spoke disrespectfully of
the master. 28
B. Freedom of Members from Assaults, Affronts, Insults, Libels
Probably no privilege claimed for the members has more frequently called for the exercise of the contempt powers of the
houses than that which guarantees that the members shall be free
from molestation during the sessions of the Parliament. Thus,
in 1623, Thomas Morley was fined IooO pounds, sent to the pil'An extended list of cases is to be found in the "Report from the Select
Committee" (of the House of Commons) on the publication of printed Papers
(May 8, 1837), P. 3 and (Appendix) p. i9,reproduced in 9 Ad. & El. 12. It is
said that more than a thousand cases of punishment for contempt by the two
houses of Parliament have occurred, though now they are of rare occurrence.
"MAY, op. cit. 114-116. For a full discussion of this privilege, see MAY,
chap. V, pp. XLO-135.

See the speaker's petition quoted above from the Assembly of Pennsyl-

vania. See also New York Ass. Jour. Vol. I, 413-414 (1718). In i66o the
House of Burgesses of Virginia passed a resolution waiving their right of
freedom from arrest in part but adding "that they will be ten days after the
expiration of this session subject to arrest, judgment, and execution against
their estates but the persons to be still free."-Jour. H. of B. z659/6o.

Ass. Jour., Vol. I, 4.
"Ass. Jour., Vol. I, 233, 234, 236, 238.
'Jour. of H. of B., i74o, (Reprint) pp. XXXII, 42i.
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lory, and imprisoned by the House of Lords, for a libel on a
member of that body. In 1781, the House of Commons committed a person who sent a challenge to a member to fight a duel,
and in i8o9, it sent one Daniel Butler, a sheriff's officer, to New29
gate prison for arresting and insulting a member.
The journals of the colonial assemblies are filled with cases
of imprisonment for molesting members. For example, in 1693,
the House of Burgesses of Virginia adopted the following:
"Resolved and accordingly ordered that Mr. Thomas
Rooke, for his several abuses to the members of the house
in general on his bended knees acknowledge his offense, and
beg the pardon of the house in such words as shall be appointed and that for the personal abuse given Mr. Kemp,
a member of the house, he ask his forgiveness in particular,
and that he remain in the Messenger's custody till further
orders." 30

In 1727, the same body called before it one Edward West,
charged with "affronting" a member, and he, "kneeling at the
Bar, was by order of the House, reprimanded by Mr. Speaker,
and upon his knees asked pardon of Mr. Andrews, and of the
House." He was then discharged upon payment of costs.
In 1723, the Virginia house arrested William Hopkins for
uttering "several rude and Contemptious and undecent expres,sions" concerning a member. Upon being ordered to apologize
on bended knee, he refused. Thereupon it was ordered:
"That said Win. Hopkins be led thro' the Town in
Custody of the Messenger by the Door Keepers of this
House Attended by the Constables of the Town, from the
Capital Gate to the College Gate- and back again with an
Inscription in great Letters pind upon his Breast in the following words ("For Insolent Behavior at the Bar of the
House of Burgesses when he was there as an offender and
with obstinacy and Contempt disobeying their Order.")
And in case he shall refuse to'walk that he be Tied to a Cart
and Drawn thro' the Town, And that he be afterwards
" For these and other illustrations see MAY, 87-88.
The form of the apology provided by the speaker is set out in full.
Jour. H. of B. 1659/6o-i693 (Reprint), pp. 473, 4, 5, 6, 7.
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committed to the public gaol in Williamsburg The Keeper
whereof is hereby required to receive and there safely to
keep him during the pleasure of this House."
This resolution brought him to terms and he was allowed to
apologize, to thank the house for the "favorable Mitigation of
my Just punishment," and to promise that, "I will from this time
carefully shew a decent Respect to every member of this House
and do earnestly entreat their good will." 3t
In 1717, the New York Assembly arrested one George
Webb, a boatman, for offering an affront to Mr. Speaker and
another member. He apologized for the "great Indignity and
Affront offered by him," and two days later was discharged,
"paying his fees." 3 2 The next year the Assembly sent its doorkeeper to arrest one Edward Penant for accusing a member of
having accepted a bribe, but he reported that Penant had left
the province.3 3 In 1729, Mr. Gilbert Livingston, member from
the Manor of Livingston, reported that Capt. Jacobus Bruyn had
said that Livingston had betrayed his country by voting supplies
to the colonial government for a period of five years. For this
insult, Bruyn was taken into custody on June 9th. As no further
record is made of his case, it is presumed that he remained in
custody until July 12th when the house adjourned. 34 In 1759,
the Pennsylvania Assembly imprisoned Thomas Christie for instigating a "false, scandalous, and groundless" election contest.
against a member." 35
C. Freedom of House as a Whole from Insults and Libels
English and colonial legislatures were always very sensitive
of their honor and dignity and quick to resent any conduct that
tended to bring them into contempt. As early as 1559, we find
the House of Commons committing William Thrower to the
" Jour. H. of B. 38D et seq.
'Ass. Journ., Vol. I, 4o6-7.
' Ibid., 419.
Ibid., 592, 594. For Samuel Townsend's case, see Ass. Jour., Vol. II
(1758) 551-4 (writing insolent letter to speaker).
'Votes of Ass., Vol. V, 57.
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custody of the sergeant for a contempt in words against the dignity of the House. In I58O, Arthur Hall, a member, was expelled, fined, and imprisoned by the House for printing "matter
of infamy of sundry good particular members of the house, and
of the whole state of the house in general, and also of the power
and authority of the house." "
The colonial assemblies, following the example of the English Parliament, struck out vigorously and often against persons insulting them or reflecting upon their dignity and power.
For example, the House of Representatives of Massachusetts in
1722 expelled a member for presenting to the house a petition
37
containing "false and reflecting expressions upon the House."
In North Carolina, the house in an address to the Governor accused the Chief Justice, William Little, and his assistants of
exacting illegal fees of office. The Chief Justice took exception
to this and sent to the Governor a petition asking for a hearing
on the charges. In the opinion of the house this document contained "Scandalous expressions reflecting on the Dignity of this
House." It was therefore
"Ordered, That the sergeant attending this House do
immediately take Mr. William Little into his custody and
him safely keep until to morrow morning and that he then
bring him before the House to Answer for his Affronting
the House by sundry Reflections exprest in his petition now
before the House." 88
In 17r7, the New York Assembly arrested the seventeen
members of the grand jury for presenting an "humble .Representation" to the Governor in regard to a bill just passed by the
Assembly. When brought to the bar of the house and examined,
they said that "they were humbly of Opinion, they might petition
one Part of the Legislature, without any intention of reflecting
on the other Two," whereupon they were discharged, "paying
their Fees." 39 The details of the case of Judge William Moore
HATSELL, 93; MAY, 86. For many other English cases see
Jour. H. of R., Vol. IV (Reprint), 43.
"SAUNDEaS, CoLo. rAL RECORDS oF N. C., Vol. III, 6o3-4.
"Ass. Jour., Vol. I, 410-411.
"I

MAY,

85-87.
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and William Smith, Provost of the Academy of Philadelphia,
who were repeatedly arrested for presenting a document to the
Governor "containing many injurious Charges, and slanderous
Aspersions against the late Assembly, and highly derogatory of,
and destructive to, the Rights of this House, and the privileges of
Assembly," will be given in another place. 40 A very striking case
of imprisonment for libelling the house occurred in New York
just on the eve of the American Revolution, the case of Captain
Alexander McDougal, who was imprisoned a total of eighty-one
days for publishing a "scandalous Reflection on the Conduct,
Honor and Dignity of this House." The details are given in the
footnote.4 1
Libels and reflections upon former assembles were resented
4
and punished, 42 as were also assaults on officers of the house, a
and the publication of the proceedings or parts thereof without
"'Votes of Ass., Vol. IV, 747-8, 763-4, 768, 769, 776, 777, 781-5, 820, 837,
846. Vol. V, 22.
"In December, 1769, a paper was published calling a mass meeting of
citizens "in order effectually to avert the Destructive Consequence of the late
base inglorious Conduct of our General Assembly," in voting supplies to the
British troops then stationed in New York. The house thereupon adopted
resolutions denouncing the publication as a "scandalous Reflection on the Conduct, Honor and Dignity of this House," and declaring the author of it "Guilty
of a high Misdemeanor." They therefore called upon the Governor to offer a
reward of So pounds for his arrest The offer was made and Captain Alexander McDougal was arrested on February 7, i77o. He refused to give bond
and was held in jail until he was indicted by the Supreme Court in the following April. He then gave bond in the sum of one thousand pounds, and was
discharged. However, as the case before the court was never brought to
trial, he was again arrested, and on December 20, 177o, he was arraigned at
the bar of the House as "the supposed author or publisher" of the article. He
pleaded, in reply, that he was already under indictment in the Supreme Court,
for the same offense, "and he conceived it would be an infraction of the laws
of Justice to punish a British subject twice for the same offense." His reply
was voted "a high contempt" and he was sent to jail, only five members voting
in the negative. He applied for habeas corpus, but upon the sergeant's showing
in his return that he was "committed by a warrant of the Speaker for a contempt of the authority of this House," the court refused to interfere. He was
finally discharged when the house was prorogued on March 4, 1771, after an
unprikonment of eighty-one days.

O'CALLAGHAN, DOCUMENTARY IhST. oF N.

Y., Vol. II, 534-537.
It is of interest to note that McDougal rose to the rank of major general
during the Revolutionary war and was a prominent member of the state senate
of New York from 1784 until his death in 1786.
"Note the last two cases mentioned above. Also the case of Hezekiah
Watkins, New York Journal, Vol. II, 5o-2I.
" In 1742, the Virginia House of Burgesses arrested and reprimanded William Nugent for beating the doorkeeper.-Jour. Pp. XX, 131, 132.
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permission.4 4 Other illustrations of punishment for libel and
slander of the house, found in our colonial history, are given in
the margin.

45

D. Control of Elections of Members
The right to determine election contests, formerly claimed
by the House of Commons and by the colonial assemblies, was
a frequent occasion for the exercise of the contempt powers of
these bodies. Prior to the time of Elizabeth election contests had
for the most part been settled by the Chancellor. From that
time until the Revolution of i688 the House of Commons contested the field with the courts, and in 1689 in the case of Bar"See

the case of Hugh Gaine.-O'CALLAGHAN, DOCUMENTARY HisT. OF

N. Y., Vol. IV, 385.
"New York, i72o, Captain Mulford forced to apologize for rash expressions concerning the Assembly-Jour., Vol. I.
New York, 1756, Rev. Hezekiah Watkins imprisoned for printing a
libel on house.-Id., Vol. II, 520-2I.
New York, 1758, Samuel Townsend arrested, held for a day, reprimanded and discharged.-Id., Vol. II, 551-55.
New York, 1765, anonymous insulting letter written to house. Governor asked to offer a reward of 50 pounds for discovery of perpetrator.-Id., Vol. II, 787.
Pennsylvania, 1743, party firing a gun loaded with shot at door of chainber.-Votes of Ass., Vol. III, pp. 539-540.
Pennsylvania, 1757, William McIlwaine ordered arrested for uttering
"false and scandalous Reflections on the House."--Absconded.-Id.,
Vol. IV, 734.
Pennsylvania, 1769, woman ordered imprisoned for behaving in a "very
disorderly Manner, as well to the Members as to the House itself."Id., Vol. VI, 152.

Pennsylvania, 1776, Capt. Josiah Hart ordered brought before the house
for refusing to pay an account allowed by the house. Having appeared before the audit committee of the house and "piaid all expenses incurred by his late Misconduct," he was discharged without
appearing at the bar of the house.-Id., Vol. V1, 705, 724.
Virginia, 1730, John Mercer and Peter Hedgman arrested, reprimanded
and discharged, "paying fees," for writing a remonstrance, "a scandalous and Seditious Libel containing false and scandalous Reflections upon the Legislature."--Jour. H. of B. (I727-34), 66, 7I:

Virginia,

1742,

John Austin made his humble "Submission" to the house

for words spoken.-Id., XX, 107, 113.

On same day a committee

was appointed to investigate a sermon preached by Rev. Mr. Fife, reflecting on members.--., Pp. XX, io8.
Virginia, 1742, address sent to Governor's council complaining that at a
conference between committees of that body and of the house, one
councilor sat with his hat on. The Council explained that no disrespect was intended but that it was only an inadvertence.-Id., Pp.
XX-XXII, 141.
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nardiston v. Soame 48 the House of Lords held that the exclusive right of passing on the legality of election returns and of
the conduct of the returning officers was in the House of Commons. After this triumph, the Commons extended the right to
include all questions respecting the right of electors to vote. Then
they argued that if electors were permitted to sue election judges
for refusing to receive their votes, there might arise a diversity of
judgments between the Commons and the courts to the confusion
of the subject and the discredit of the House. Therefore, in 17o4,
in the celebrated case of "the Aylesbury men," where five voters
began actions in the courts against the election officers for refusing their votes, the House held the plaintiffs guilty of contempt
and sent them to Newgate prison. This was later recognized
has not been folas an excess of authority, and the precedent
47
lowed for a hundred and fifty years.
In America, the colonial assemblies from the beginning assumed control of questions arising in connection with the election
of their members. They summoned the sheriffs before them and
reprimanded and otherwise disciplined them for failure to perform their duties as returning officers.48 In Virginia, persons
guilty of riotous conduct at elections, 4 91 and persons charged with
fraudulently securing signatures to a petition complaining of the
"6 State Tr. xiig (689).
64-66. Since 1868 election contests in England have been settled
by two judges selected from the King's Bench Division of the High Court of
"MAY,

Justice.-Id., 641-643.
" In New York: In 1747, the High Sheriff of Richmond was called on to
explain his failure to send in the returns. "He humbly hoped that as what he
had done was through inadvertency, the House would not proceed to greater
Severities." He was let off with a reprimand by the speaker, "paying fees."-

Jour., Vol. II, 2

8, 9. Another similar case occurred in 176r. Id., 658.

In Pennsylvania: In 1707, the sheriff was brought to the bar and "made
his humble submission to the House, and promised to bring the said returns Tomorrow."--Votes of Ass., Vol. II, 2, 3.
In 174o, the former sheriff of Bucks, when brought before the bar, showed
that his failure was not "through willful Neglect or Contempt of the House."

Reprimanded. Id., Vol. III, 425-6.

In 1756, William Parsons was charged with having detained the writ of
election intended for the sheriff. He was allowed counsel and time to prepare
for trial. Later the sergeant was told at his lodgings that "he had been gone
out of town, some days, to Amboy, for the Recovery of his Health, and was
not expected to return again to Philadelphia."-Id., Vol. IV, 743.

"Jour. H. of B., i727-174o, pp. XXVIII, 27&
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election of certain members, 50 were sent for in the custody of
the sergeant-at-arns and forced to confess their wrongs, to
apologize to the house, and to pay their fees. In the same colony in 174o, a member was deprived of his seat upon a showing
that he had promised to pay the fines that might be assessed
against voters who were unfavorable to him and who would remain away from the polls, in violation of law; and a non-member
who was guilty of the same offense was forced to acknowledge
his fault and apologize.5 In Pennsylvania, the assembly as the
"grand inquest of the province", investigated riots at the polls
and requested the Governor to direct the judges of the courts
52
to make a thorough probe of the violations of the law.
E. General InquisitorialPowers-Unwilling Witnesses
The colonial assemblies, like the House of Commons, very
early assumed, usually without question, the right to investigate
the conduct of the other departments of the government and also
other matters of general concern brought to their attention. These
investigations were sometimes conducted by the House itself and
sometimes by committees clothed with authority to send for
"persons, papers, and records." For example, during the Indian
war of 1722, the Massachusetts House of Representatives engaged in a-long-drawn-out controversy with the Governor over
their asserted right to call before them for examination Colonel
Walton and Major Moody, the heads of the colonial forces in
Maine, to determine the responsibility for the failure to carry
out certain offensive operations ordered by the house at a previous session. They had no power to remove military officers,
but they asserted it to be "not only their Privilege but Duty to
demand of any Officer in the pay and service of this Government
3
an account of his Management while in the Public Imploy." 5
"*Id., 31, 32, 33, 34.
"Id., pp. XXXIII, 426-7.
"Votes of Ass., Vol. III, 498-5o3.
"Jour., Vol. IV, 165. [The Journals from

1715-1724 have been reprinted
in five volumes by Mass. Hist. Society.] The upshot of the controversy was
that the House finally secured the testimony desired, along with that of many

other witnesses, and ultimately brought about the retirement of Walton and
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In Pennsylvania, in 1742, as has already been noted, the assembly summoned a great many witnesses for the purpose of investigating riots at an election, at the conclusion of which they requested the Governor to direct the courts to go into the matter
fully and punish the wrong-doers. There is nothing to indicate
54
that the house at any time contemplated taking any other action.
In this colony-and the same was true of most of the coloniesthe Assembly had a standing committee to audit and settle the
accounts of the treasurer and of the collectors of public revenues.
This committee could sit during recesses of the house and was
clothed with "full Power and Authority to send for Persons, Papers and Records by the Sergeant at Arms of this House, in order
that all the said public Accounts be fully settled and made ready
to be laid before the House on the first Day of their Meeting in
September next." 15 In 1770, the house ordered the assessors and
collectors of Lancaster County to appear before the audit committee and to bring with them their books and records for the preceding ten years.5 6 In North Carolina, the Assembly ordered the arrest and detention of the receiver of "powder money" at "Roanoak," for his refusal, in compliance 57with the Governor's orders,
to submit his accounts to the house.
The foregoing are only a few of the many investigations
of all manner of subjects carried on by the colonial assemblies.
In all these cases, they assumed as a matter of course that they
had authority to punish as for contempt any person who refused
to appear and give the information called for. Thus, in 1691,
the New York Assembly having been informed that Mr. Dally,
Moody from the service. Later when the house learned that Walton was still
exercising his functions "and is bound Eastward, having given out such
Speeches as (if possible to be accomplished by him) may prove very pernicious
to this Government," they
"Resolved, That the Sheriff of the County of Suffolk, be directed
forthwith to follow the said Colonel Walton, and order his return to
Boston, to attend the Order of this court."--Jour., Vol. IV, i99. See also
PP. 94, 95-6, 126, 128, 130, 132-3, 146, i55, 156, 163-5, 167, 170, 177, 179,
182, 183, i86, i88, I9I-2, 194-5. See also HuTcHiNsoN, HrsT. OF MAss.
BAY, Vol. II, 276-294.
"Votes of Ass., Vol. III, 498-503, 564, et seq.
"Votes of Ass., Vol. VI, 2, I1, 193, 66-I02.

"Id.,
a

I99, 24.
3 SAUNDERS, COLONIAL REcoRDs OF N. C., 585-6, 6o4.
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"the French Minister," had received a petition signed by several
inhabitants of Harlem and Westchester, he was called before the
house, and, having refused to answer the questions put to him,
was declared guilty of contempt and committed "to the custody
of the Serjeant at Arms, and there to remain until he shall make
Answer, or be discharged by the House." 1s The refusal of Samuel Townsend to appear when summoned before the house to answer for writing an insulting letter to the speaker met with like
treatment in i758.19
In this connection, the case of William Moore and William
Smith, which arose in Pennsylvania in 1757, is so instructive
and illustrates so many of the powers under discussion that it
seems worth while to state it in some detail. Complaints having
been made to the house that William Moore, Judge of the court
of common pleas and justice of the peace, had for a long time
been guilty of "fraudulent, corrupt and wicked practices," the
house examined many witnesses and sent an address to the Governor asking him to remove Moore.60 It seems to have been conceded that the Governor alone had the power of removal and
there is nothing in the record to indicate that any legislation on
the subject was in contemplation. When a newly elected assembly met in January, 1758, Judge Moore was arrested and charged
with having presented to the Governor and printed in the newspapers a document "containing many injurious charges, and
slanderous Aspersions against the Conduct of the late Assembly." 61 At the same time William Smith, "Provost of the
Academy of this City," was arrested, charged with having assisted in the preparation of the paper. Among the witnesses
examined touching Smith's part in the affair, was Dr. Phineas
Bond, who, feeling honor-bound not to tell what he knew, was
promptly committed to the custody of the sergeant to be held
until he should answer the questions put to him, no one being
permitted to speak to him except in the presence of the sergeant.
"Ass. Jour., Vol. I, 9-io. The subject matter of the petition is not given.
" Id., Vol. II, 552, 553, 554.
' Votes of Assembly, Vol. IV, 747-8.
Votes of Assembly, Vol. IV, 763-4.
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Another witness was committed for "prevaricating in his Testimony, and refusing to answer." 6 2 As a result of the hearing
the Assembly declared Judge Moore guilty of contempt and
ordered that he be confined in the "common Gaol of the County
of Philadelphia, there to remain until he shall willingly make
such a Retraction of the Aspersions and Falsehoods contained
in the said Libel, as this House shall approve of." At the same
time the sheriff was instructed not to "obey any writ of Habeas
Corpus, or other Writ whatsoever, that may come to his hand
for the Bailing or Discharging the said William Moore, or otherwise discharge him from his Custody, on any Pretence whatsoever, and that this House will support him in his Obedience to
this Order." 3 Smith was also held guilty and sent to jail.
Through his counsel he gave notice of his intention to appeal the
case to the King in Council, but the house held that no appeal
would lie in a contempt proceeding. From the jail he wrote a
letter to the speaker insisting on his right to appeal, but the house,
considering this a "further Insult upon them, returned no Answer
thereto." 64 In April, 1758, the Assembly took a short recess
and Moore and Smith were discharged on habeas corpus, in accordance with the rule that imprisonment by the House of Commons terminates with the session, but when the house met again
they were rearrested and held to the end of the session in September. The matter was taken up again in the session beginning
in October, 1758, and an order for their rearrest was made on
February 28, 1759, but the sergeant-at-arms reported
5 that Moore
had absconded and Smith had sailed for England.
One more incident in connection with the Moore and Smith
case is worthy of notice. At one stage in the hearings the house
was disturbed by hand-clapping, stamping and other noises on
'In this case the sergeant was ordered "not to permit any Person whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, to converse with or speak to the said Armbruster, till further Orders from this House."--Votes of Assembly, Vol. VI,

776.

Id., 769.
"Votes of Assembly, Vol. VI, 777, 781, 784.
Id., Vol. V, 5,22. It seems that the house failed to get rid of Moore,
for in z775 we find him still oppressing the people as a justice of the peace.Votes of Ass., Vol. VI, 665.
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the part of the spectators. This was voted an insult and many
of those present were haled before the bar of the house, where,
after apologizing, they were reprimanded by the speaker and
ordered to pay the fees for their arrest. Those who refused to
appear when summoned were arrested and also those who failed
or refused to pay their fees. 66
This case, it will be observed, epitomizes to a large extent
the contempt powers exercised by the colonial assemblies. Here
the Pennsylvania body asserted its right to investigate a public
official, although it did not claim the right to impeach or otherwise to remove him, and did not indicate any intention of legislating on the subject under investigation. It also asserted its right
to punish libellous reflections upon itself and to vindicate the
good name of a preceding assembly. It declared and exercised
the right to punish contumacious witnesses and witnesses giving
false testimony. It held that there was no right of appeal from
a judgment of contempt and that habeas corpus did not lie until
after the recess or adjournment of the house. Finally it asserted
its right to protect itself against disturbances from onlookers.
In view of this great precedent it is not at all surprising to find
the national House of Representatives in the very same city,
forty years later, punishing Randall and Whitney for offering
bribes to members, and the Senate proceeding against William
67
Duane for publishing a libel upon it.
III.

EARLY STATE AND NATIONAL PRECEDENTS

The foregoing survey of English and American colonial practice shows clearly that it was the generally accepted view that legislative bodies had the inherent right to protect their privileges, their
dignity, and their honor by use of the power to punish for contempt. The precedents were plentiful and had continued down
to the outbreak of the struggle for independence. The statesmen of the period were thoroughly familiar with these precedents
and regarded the power to punish for contempt as an integral
"Id., Vol. IV, 781-5, 786, 837, 843.
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HINDS, PRECEDENTS, 1047-52, 1052-56.
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part, or auxiliary, of legislative power. As a necessary result,
when they drafted their constitutions, state and national, and
conferred the legislative power upon the bodies provided to receive it, they conferred the contempt power along with the rest.
This doubtless explains the fact that most of the states, in drafting their new fundamental laws, made no mention whatever of
the power to punish for contempt Of the eleven states adopting
constitutions, during the Revolution, nine made no reference to
the power to punish for contempt. Massachusetts and Maryland
alone dealt directly with this subject.
The provisions incorporated in the Massachusetts constitution adopted in 178o and continued down to the present time
are especially interesting, and were subsequently adopted almost
without change in New Hampshire 6 8 and South Carolina, 69 and
possibly in other states. After declaring, in Article VI, "that
the house of representatives is the grand inquest of this commonwealth, and all impeachments made by them shall be heard
and tried by the Senate," the Constitution, in Article X, proceeds as follows:
"The House of representatives . . . shall have author-

ity to punish by imprisonment every person, not a member,
who shall be guilty of disrespect to the house, by any disorderly or contemptuous behavior in its presence; or who,
in the town where the general court is sitting, and during
the time of its sitting, shall threaten harm to the body or
estate of any of its members, for anything said or done in
the house; or who shall assault any of them therefor; or
who shall assault or arrest, any witness, or other person,
ordered to attend the house, in his way in going or returning; or who shall rescue any person arrested by the order
of the house."

"Constitution

of

70

1784,

4 THioRP,

AmE.ICAN CHARTERS, CONSTrruToNs

AND ORGANIC LAWS, 2462. The provisions were retained in the constitutions
of New Hampshire adopted in 1792, and 1902; 4 THoRPE, 2477-8, 25o.
"Constitution of i79o, Sec. 13 of Art. I, 6 T~oRPE, 326b. The same provision reappears as Art. I, sec. 19 of the constitution adopted in 1865, as Art.

II, sec. 16 of the constitution of 1868, and as Art. III, sec. 13, of the constitution of 1895. 6 THoRPE, 3272 3287, 3314.

"Constitution of 178o, Chap. I, Sec. III, Art. Y 3 THoRP , 1899. In
the case of Bunham v. Morrisey, 14 Gray 226 .(Mass. 1859), the Supreme
Court held that these provisions were not grants of power to the houses, nor
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The next article extended the same powers to the Senate and to
the Governor and Council, and then occurs this proviso:
"provided, that no imprisonment on the order or warrant
of the Governor, council, senate, or house of representatives,
for either of the above described offences, be for a term exceeding thirty days."
In Maryland the constitution went much further conferring
upon each of the houses unlimited power to investigate all grievances, and "affairs concerning the public interest," to "commit
any person, for any crime, to the public jail, there to remain till
he be discharged by due course of law," and to punish for contempt in a great variety of cases. The provisions are so interesting, as indicating the temper of the times, that they are re72
produced in full in the footnote.
did they by implication deny to the houses power to punish for contempt in
other cases not here enumerated. Their purpose, said the court, was to define
and make explicit powers inherent in all legislative bodies. In one respect they
extended the inherent power of the houses, by enabling them to commit for a
period extending beyond the time of adjournment. See also Coffin v. Coffin,
4 Mass. 1, 34-5 (i8o8).
'"This proviso was not adopted by South Carolina. New Hampshire
adopted it, but with the term of imprisonment limited to a period not exceeding
ten days.
Constitution of 1776, Arts. X and XIL 3 THORPE, 1692.
Art. X: "They (members of the House of Delegates) may inquire on
the oath of witnesses, into all complaints, grievances, and offenses, as the
grand inquest of this state; and may commit any person, for any crime, to
the public jail, there to remain till he be discharged by due course of law.
They may expel any member, for a great misdemeanor, but not a second
time for the same cause. They may examine and pass all accounts of the
State, relating either to the collection or expenditure of the revenue, or
appoint auditors, to state and adjust the same. They may call for all public or official papers and records, and send for persons, whom they may
judge necessary in the course of inquiries concerning affairs relating to
the public interest; and may direct al official bonds (which shall be made
payable to the State) to be sued upon for any breach of duty."
Art. XII: "That the House of Delegates may punish, by imprisonment, any person who shall be guilty of a contempt in their view, by any
disorderly or riotous behavior, or by threat to, or abuse of their members,
or by any obstruction to their proceedings. They may also punish, by imprisonment, any person who shall be guilty of a breach of privilege, by
arresting on civil process, or by assaulting any of their members, during
!heir sitting, or on their way to, or return from the House of Delegates,
or by any assault of, or obstruction to their officers, in the execution of any
order or process, or by assaulting or obstructing any witness, or any other
person, attending on, or on their way to or from the House, or by rescuing
any. person committed by the House. And the Senate may exercise the
same power, in similar cases."
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Like the nine state constitutions, the Constitution of the
United States is silent on the subject of contempt. Each house is
given power to judge of the election and qualification of its members, to make its own rules of procedure, punish its members for
disorderly conduct, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds,
expel a member, but nothing is said of any power to deal with
73
outsiders who may disturb the house or obstruct its proceedings.
Such was the state of the first written constitutions on this
subject.7 4 Their silence on the subject is suggestive. Equally
so is the fact that for three-quarters of a century no case involving the contempt power of a legislative body except Anderson v.
Dunn,75 reached the higher courts, state or federal. This absence
of adjudicated cases strongly suggests that there was a general
acquiescence in the exercise of this power, for there was no dearth
of cases in the legislatures that might have found their way into
the courts if the persons concerned and their counsel had thought
that relief could be obtained from that source. Since the constitutions and the court reports are silent we must turn to the
Assemblies themselves. What, then, was the practice of the new
legislatures? The answer is to be found scattered through a
multitude of legislative journals, usually poorly printed and unindexed, that have not yet been fully explored. However, ample
evidence has been assembled to warrant the statement that the
Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 5.
"As to the contempt power in the state constitutions at the end of the
Nineteenth Century, see an article by Frederick W. Whitridge "Legislative Inquests," i Po.. Sc. QUART. 84 (1886).
"6 Wheat. 204 (U. S. 1821).
Two early state cases, while not directly concerned with the contempt
power, show clearly that the courts regarded it as inherent in legislative bodies.
In the first, Bolton v. Martin, i DalIl. 296 (1789), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the delegates to the convention called in that state to ratify
the federal constitution enjoyed the same freedom from arrest on civil process
as the members of the state legislature. While the latter had no privileges conferred upon them by express grant, the court said that "its members are legally
and inherently possessed of all such privileges as are necessary to enable them,
with freedom and safety, to execute the great trusts reposed in them by the
body of the people who elected them."
The second case, Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. I (i8o8), held that the legislative bodies in Massachusetts are for some purposes courts and may punish
for contempt of their authority, though the point was not directly involved in
the case. See pp. 34-35.
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legislative bodies assumed that the contempt power so freely
exercised by the colonial assemblies had been passed on to them
without diminution. For example, in March, 1776, it was reported to the Continental Congress that one Isaac Melchior had
treated the president of the Congress with "great -rudeness" and
had made "use of several disrespectful and contemptuous expressions towards him and this Congress." It was, therefore,
"Ordered, That the said Isaac Melchior attend Congress tomorrow morning at eleven o'clock, to answer for his
conduct."
When he appeared, he denied any recollection of what he had
done, "owing to the particular circumstances he happened to be
under," and apologizing to Congress and its president, he was
dismissed without further punishment, "in consideration of Mr.
Melchior former services." 76 A year later, Mr. Gunning Bedford was declared "guilty of a high breach of the privileges of
this House, in sending a challenge to one of its members for
words spoken by him in this House, in the course of debate," and
he was required to "ask pardon of the House, and of the member
challenged." ",
In Virginia, whose constitution made no provision for punishing for contempt, the House of Delegates in 178I appointed
standing committees on religion, on privileges and elections, on
courts of justice, and on trade, and clothed each of them with
the power to "send for persons, papers, and records for their
information." At the same session the same power was specially
conferred on the committee on privileges and electiofis, which
was ordered to investigate the opposition- "in arms," on the part
of some of the people of Augusta, to a law passed by the preceding legislature. 78 There is nothing in the record to show that
any legislation or other affirmative action was contemplated s a
result of this inqury. During the same session, the house ordered
the immediate arrest of one John Hopkins, a clerk in the treasury
" Jour. of Cong., Mar. 7, 1776, p. 84.
Id., June 12 and 14, 1777, Pp. 232, 236.
"Jour. H. of B., 1781, p. 8.
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department, upon a report of contemplated misconduct on his
part. He was discharged the next day, and later vindicated by
the committee appointed to look into the matter. 9 In 1784, one
John Warden, a Scotchman resident in Virginia was sent for
under the custody of the sergeant-at-arms for "uttering certain
expressions derogatory to the honor and justice of the same."
Warden presented a written apology to the committee expressing
his sorrow at having given unintentional affront and the matter
went no further.8 0
In Pennsylvania, the Senate, in I8oi, ordered the arrest of
one Peter Getz for disturbing the proceedings of the body,' and
R.
in 1835 several contumacious witnesses, including Joseph
82
houses.
the
of
one
by
confined
and
arrested
were
Chandler,
Under the first constitution of New York, which provided
that the assembly should "proceed in doing business in like manner as the assemblies of the colony of New York of right formerly did,"8 3 several cases of the exercise of the contempt power
occurred. In 1796 the house punished one Kilittas for charging
that a committee of the house had acted corruptly. In 18io, the
senate punished a man named Clarke for having challenged Senator DeWitt Clinton to a duel for words spoken by him in debate. About the same time the house punished a printer for
"Id., pp. 6, 7, 38, 58. It will be noted that this case is indefensible, as his
alleged unlawful plan was not directed against the house in any way.
The resolution adopted by the house on this occasion was as follows:
"Information being given to the House, by a member in his place, that
John Warden, of the county of Hanover, hath been guilty of a high contempt and breach of privilege of this House, in uttering certain expressions
derogatory to the honor and justice of the same.
Ordered, That the subject-matter be referred to the Committee on
Privileges and Election; that they do examine the matter thereof, and report the same, with their opinion thereon, to the House.
Ordered, That the Sergeant-at-Arms attending this House take into
his custody the body of the said John Warden, and Mr. Speaker is desired
to issue his warrant accordingly."
The member calling the matter to the attention of the house is supposed to
have been Patrick Henry. Other prominent members of this b6dy were James
Madison, Richard H. Lee, and John Marshall. Madison was a member of the
committee to which this case was referred.--Cong. Debates, 1831-32, Vol. 8,
Part 2, pp. 2880-81.
Sen. Jour., Nov. i8oo, 289, 320, 328, 334-35.
22

HINDS, PRECEDENTS, 1105.

"Constitution of 1777, 5 THORPE, 2631.
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breach of its privileges. s 4 The new constitution adopted in 1821,
omitted the provision above referred to and merely provided that
5
each house should determine the rules of its own proceedings.1
In discussing this change, the revisors of 1830 say:
"It is believed that the omission of these words, in the
amended constitution, was not intended to deprive, and could
not have the effect of depriving, the two Houses of the Legislature of the indispensable power of punishing for contempt." 86
Accordingly they submitted an act defining the contempt powers
of the legislature and naming the privileges the breach of which
might be punished by imprisonment.
In the meantime, the house of representatives of New York,
operating under the new constitution, had asserted and exercised
the power in the case of William J. Caldwell. In 1824, the house
appointed a special committee to investigate and determine
whether any corrupt means had been used in securing the charter
of the Chemical Bank. What action, if any, was contemplated
as a result of the investigation, does not appear. Caldwell refused to appear before the committee and testify, and wrote a
letter to the chairman containing reflections upon the house.
Being arrested and arraigned at the bar of the house, he admitted
writing the letter and refusing to testify. Thereupon the house
adopted this resolution:
"Resolved, That there was no sufficient ground for his
refusal to appear before the committee, and testify; that
he was guilty of a misdemeanor and contempt of the House;
that the sergeant-at-arms deliver him to the keeper of the
jail of the county of Albany; that he be imprisoned until
further order of the House, and that the Speaker issue his
warrant accordingly."
"These three cases are referred to in the debates in Congress on Samuel
Houston's case in I832.-Cong. Debates, Vol. 8, Part 2, p. 2843, and Part 3,
pp. 3006-7.
"Art. I, Sec. 3. 5 THoRPa, 2640.
'Wickelhausen v. Willett, io Abb. Prac. 164, 171 (186o). This statement
of the revisers of 183o is quoted with approval in the leading New York case,
McDonald v. Keeler, 99 N. Y. 463, 475 (1885).
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before the committee and
After a week's imprisonment he came
87
discharged.
then
was
testified, and
Another notable case arose in New York in 1837, involving
the refusal of Moses Jaques and Levi Slamm to appear and
testify before a committee of the house of representatives appointed to inquire whether or not the banks of the state had
been using their funds for other than legitimate banking purposes. Here again there is nothing in the record to indicate what
the purpose of the investigation was or what action was contemplated by the house. The motion that these parties were
guilty of contempt and that the speaker issue his warrant and
bring them before the house, was carried by a vote of 75 to 18.
Slamm submitted and was discharged, but Jaques at first refused
and was ordered imprisoned until he should agree to testifysS

While these instances were occurring in the state legislatures, the houses of the Congress of the United States had on
several occasions asserted their right to punish for contempt.
The first important case /arose, when the new government was
less than seven years old, out of an attempt to bribe members
of the House of Representatives. In December, 1795, three members arose in their places and stated that they had been offered
financial inducements by one Robert Randall to support a proposed grant to him and his associates of a large body of Western
lands. Like information was given by one member against Randall's associate, Charles Whitney. They were arrested and
brought before the house, and, after a hearing, the house adopted,
by a vote of 78 to 17, the following resolutions offered by Mr.
Edward Livingston of New York:
"Resolved, That it appears to this House that Robert
Randall has been guilty of a contempt to, and a breach of
the privileges of, this House by attempting to corrupt the
integrity of its members in the manner laid to his charge.
"Resolved, That the said Robert Randall be brought
'Jour.

Ass., Nov. 1824, pp. 1229, 1265-66, 1288, 1351.

hausen v. Willett, supra, note 86.
'Jour. Ass., 1837, 133-136, 262, 371, 381,

See also Wickel-

423-424, 433-440, 466, 488-489.
Also Ass. Doc. 198 and 237 (1837), and Wickelhausen v. Willett, supra, note

86.
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to the bar, reprimanded by the Speaker, and committed to
the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms until further order of
this House."
After eight days of confinement under this resolution, Randall
was, upon his humble petition, discharged from custody. 9
A very significant feature of this case is that there seems
to have been no division of opinion among the members present,
several of whom had been members of the Constitutional Convention,90 as to the power of the house to punish a non-member
for such an offense. There was much discussion as to the
proper method of procedure-whether the accused should have
the assistance of counsel, whether all questions should be asked
by the Speaker and whether the testimony of the accusing members of the house should be given under oath-but practically
none at all on the constitutional aspects of the case. Madison,
one of the drafters of the Constitution, counseled deliberation, but
expressed no doubt of the authority of the house. On the whole,
the conclusion seems warranted that this body of representative
men gathered from all the states, thoroughly versed in the legislative practice of the time, were substantially agreed that the
grant of the legislative power to Congress carried with it by
implication the power to punish for contempt. 9x
In i8oo, an interesting case arose in the Senate growing out
"Journal, ist Sess. Fourth Cong., pp. 389, 391, 392, 393, 395, 397, 405, 407,
5 Annals, pp. z66-17o, 177, 179, 185-195, 212, 222-229. 2 HiNDS, PRECEDENTS, pp. 1047-1052.
414.

oThe Speaker, John Dayton, of New Jersey, James Madison, of Virginia,
Nicholas Gilman, of New Hampshire, and Abraham Baldwin, of Georgia, had
all sat in the Constitutional Cpnvention and signed the draft-constitution. In
addition to these men, the house contained other well-known statesmen and
able lawyers, among whom may be mentioned Albert Gallatin, of Pennsylvania,
afterwards Secretary of the Treasury, Edward Livingston, of New York,
afterwards Secretary of State under President Jackson, William B. Giles, of
Virginia, and Jeremiah Smith, of New Hampshire.
"Just before the vote was taken John Nicholas, of Virginia, raised the issue of the power of the house to punish for contempt. "At the first embarking of the House in this affair, he had felt doubts. His scruples had gradually augmented, and he was now of opinion that Randall should not have
been meddled with at all, in the present way. . . . He did not think that any
resolution had yet passed the House, upon due consideration, whether they had
a right to proceed or not."--5 Annals, 219.
Little, if any, attention was given to this suggestion, and a few minutes
later the resolution by Mr. Livingston, quoted above, was adopted.
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of the publication, by William Duane, editor of the Aurora, of an
alleged libel of the Senate and of one of its committees. Duane
was ordered to appear at the bar of the Senate and "make any
proper defense for his conduct in publishing the aforesaid false,
defamatory, scandalous, and malicious assertions and pretended
information." He appeared and asked to be allowed counsel,
which request was granted with certain restrictions as to the
functions to be performed by counsel. Later he wrote to the
Vice-President saying that on account of the restrictions placed on
counsel, reputable lawyers to whom he had applied refused to
appear in his behalf, and informing the Senate that he would not
attend further, and stating that the Senate could take such further
action as it should see fit. For this refusal to appear, not for
printing the libel, the Senate, by a vote of 16 to 12, held him
"guilty of a contempt of said order, and of this House, and that,
for said contempt, he the said William Duane be taken into the
custody of the Sergeant-at'Arms attending this House, to be kept
subject to the further orders of the Senate." This occurred on
March 26. There is no record that he was again arrested, but
just before the Senate adjourned on May 14, a resolution was
adopted requesting the President to direct that Duane be prosecuted and punished by the courts of law 1 2
In this case the power of the Senate to punish Duane was
vigorously contested in one of the ablest debates of this period.
Unfortunately, as the Aurora was a strongly Anti-Federalist
paper, partisan feeling was involved and we cannot be certain how
far the views expressed and the votes cast were influenced by party
considerations. 93 While the arguments of Jefferson's followers
did not convince the majority of the Senate, as the vote on the
resolution showed, they may have so influenced them that they
decided to let the matter drop. Probably a more potent factor
"Sen. Jour., 6th Cong., Ist Sess., pp. 45, 51-54, 55, 56, 58, 59-65; io An-

nals, 63, 68-93, 104-5, 112-115, 117,

118,

M21-I24,

184; 2 HINDS, PRECEDENTS,

I052-IO56. It seems that Duane was prosecuted and sentenced to serve thirty
days in lail.-2 HINDS, i052-i056.
"Thomas Jefferson, who was Vice-President and presided over the Senate
during this debate, afterwards summarized in his "Manual" prepared for the
Senate, the arguments for and againft the exercise of the contempt power.
Pp. I8-ig.
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was the approaching presidential election and the state of public
opinion at the time, aroused by the odious Alien and Sedition laws,
passed two years before for punishing just such expressions of
opinion as Duane was guilty of. The rumblings, of which the
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions were a part, might well have
caused a determined majority to forego the full measure of redress
to which they were legally entitled.
Passing over some less important cases we come to what was,
perhaps, the greatest of the early cases involving the right of one
branch of Congress to punish for contempt. This arose in the
House, in i818, when Lewis Williams, a member from North
Carolina, laid before that body a letter that he had received from
Captain John Anderson, containing a check for $5oo, as "part
pay for extra trouble" in furthering certain claims in which the
writer was interested. Thereupon Mr. John Forsyth, of Georgia,
moved the following resolution, which was adopted, "and ordered
to be entered unaninously":
"'Resolved, uaninowsly, That Mr. Speaker do issue his
warrant directed to the Sergeant-at-Arms attending this
House, commanding him to take into custody, wherever to
be found, the body of John Anderson, and the same in his
custody to keep, subject to the further order and direction
of this House."
Before the resolution was voted upon, the question was raised
as to the power of the Speaker to issue a general warrant Henry
Clay, the Speaker, said that fortunately there were few occasions
for the exercise of the power but that there could be no question
of the authority of the House to protect its privileges and its
dignity.

94

Anderson was brought before the bar of the House and a
long and instructive debate took place, at the conclusion of which
a resolution to discharge Anderson from custody was indefinitely
postponed by the decisive vote of I 17 to 42, and the House held

him guilty of contempt and ordered him reprimanded by the
"Jour. 15th Cong., Ist Sess., pp. 117, 119, 129, 154; 31 Annals, 58o-583;
2 HINDS, PRECEDENTS, 1058-9.
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Speaker.9 5 In this decisive fashion the House after exhaustive
debate definitely settled the question, so far as it could do so, that
it had by necessary implication, wholly independently of any constitutional provision, the power to protect itself and to carry on
its functions without obstruction or interference from without.
In this position it was fully sustained by the Supreme Court in the
suit for damages for false imprisonment brought by Anderson
against Dunn, the sergeant-at-arms,98 which will be discussed in
another connection.
The House of Representatives in the early days was several
times called upon to vindicate the right of the members to be free
from assault for words spoken in debate. In 18o9, one I. -A.
Coles was held guilty of a breach of the privileges of the House
for assaulting a member in the Capitol building, after the House
had adjourned, although it appeared that the occasion of the attack
was not in any way connected with the business of the House. 97
In 1828, Russel Jarvis was charged, in a message from the President, with having assaulted John Adams, the President's private
secretary, while he was in the Capitol building, and in the act of
retiring from the House, to which he had just delivered a message
from the President. The House held Jarvis guilty of violating
the privilege of the House and meriting the censure of that body.9 8
But the great case involving the right of the House to punish an
assault on a member came in 1832, when Samuel Houston, formerly governor of Tennessee, and later president of the Republic
of Texas, was held guilty of contempt and was reprimanded for
an assault on William Stanbury, a member of the House from
Ohio, for words spoken by Stanbury in debate. Houston was a
warm personal friend of President Jackson, and the discussion
out of which the provocation grew was aimed at the conduct of
the President's Secretary of War. As a result the affair from
the beginning, like the Duane case, took on a partisan aspect, so
that much that was said in the long and vehement debate, loses the
force that it would otherwise be entitled to. The significant thing
9531 Annals, 589-9.
"Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. -204 (U. S. 1821).
"Jour. H. of R., iith Cong., 2d Sess., pp. II1, 123, 147, 148; Annals, pp.
685, 705, 987; 2 HINDs, PRECEDENTS, io96.

9Jour. 2oth Cong. ist Sess.,. p. 587; Cong. Debates, p. 2715; 2 HINDS,
PRECEDENTS, 1081-3.
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about the case is that those who favored the vindication of the
privileges of the House were able to carry through their purpose
in the face of the opposition of the dominant party and of the
indomitable Jackson.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows: On April 14,
1832, the Speaker laid before the House a communication from
Stanbury, in which he stated that on the previous evening he had
been waylaid on the street near his boarding house and "knocked
down by a bludgeon, and severely bruised and wounded by Samuel
Houston." Immediately upon the conclusion of the reading of the
communication, Joseph Vance, of Ohio, offered a resolution directing the Speaker to issue his warrant for the arrest of Houston.
This passed by a vote of io6 yeas to 65 nays. Houston was
brought before the House, allowed counsel in the person of
Francis S. Key, denied bail on the strength of the precedents of
the House of Commons, and brought to trial before the whole
House. The trial occupied the time of the House for almost a
month. After the testimony was all in many days were devoted
to debate, at the conclusion of which, the following resolutions
were separately voted on and adopted, the first by a vote of io6
to 88, and the second by a vote of 96 to 84.
"Resolved, That Samuel Houston has been guilty of
contempt and a violation of the privileges of this House.
"Resolved, That Samuel Houston be brought to the bar
of the House on Monday next, at 12 o'clock, and be there
reprimanded by the Speaker for the contempt and violation
of the privileges of the House of which he has been guilty,
and that he then be discharged from the custody of the
Sergeant-at-Arms." 9w
The power to compel testimony from unwilling witnesses,
which as we have seen was frequently exercised in colonial days,
and was exercised by the New York legislature in the cases of
W. J. Caldwell and of Jaques and Slamm, in 1824 and in 1837,
was also made use of by the national House of Representatives
during the first half of the last century. The first case was in
1812, when Nathaniel Rounsavell was committed for refusing to
"Jour.

22d Cong., ist Sess., pp. 59o, 593, 595, 6oo, 604, 61o, 713, 725, 730,
2 HINDS, PRECEDENTS, 1083-1089.

736; Debates, 25ii-2619, 28IO-3O22;
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give testimony before a committee of the House appointed to
"inquire whether there has been any, and, if any, what violation
of the secrecy imposed by this House," in regard to a proposed
embargo that had been discussed in a secret session of the House.
After remaining in custody a day he indicated his willingness to
testify and was discharged. 10 0 The second case occurred in 1837,
when Reuben M. Whitney was arrested and held for some days
while preparing for trial, on a charge of refusing to testify before
a special committee of the House appointed to investigate matters
pertaining to the executive departments." 1
From the foregoing review of the cases it is now quite apparent that the changes attendant upon the separation from England and the establishment of state and national governments
under written constitutions resulted in no abandonment on the
part of the legislatures of the right so freely, and sometimes, it
must be said, so harshly used during the colonial period, of punishing directly and without the intervention of courts or the
authority of statutes those who obstructed their proceedings or
reflected upon their integrity. In this survey of early state and
national precedents we have seen the power exercised (i) by
the Continental Congress, a voluntary body which had assumed
the powers of a national legislature but which as yet had no written constitution behind it; (2) by state legislative bodies, especially in Virginia and New York, where the constitutions did not
confer the power but were wholly silent on the subject; and (3)
by the Houses of Congress, although the power was not expressly
conferred. in the constitution, but was asserted as a necessary
means of self-defense inherent in all legislative bodies.
C. S. Potts.
Cambridge, Mass.
(To be Continued.)
"Jour. 12th Cong., 1st Sess., 1812, pp. 276, 277, 28o; Annals, p. 1266; 3
HINDS, PRECEDENTS, I.

... Jour. 24th Cong., ist Sess., pp. 232, 367-372, 378-382, 407-417, 489; Congressional Debates, 1685-1707, 1735-1754, 1760-1773, 1789; 3 HINDs, PRECEDENT- 2-8 He was never declared guilty of contempt, for in the course of the

trial before the House it developed that there had been a serious difficulty between respondent and two members of the committee and that his refusal to appear a second time before the committee was probably due to fear. The House
thereupon ordered that he be discharged from custody.

